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Bernstein: Pleading

PLEADING
ISADORE S. BERNSTEIN*

Judgment on Pleadings
The nature and effect of a motion for judgment on the
pleadings was fully treated in Walter J. Klein Co. v. Kneece.1
The plaintiff, a judgment creditor, brought action for the purpose of setting aside a conveyance of real estate by the debtor
to his wife as having been made in violation of the Statute
of Elizabeth. 2 It was alleged that the transfer was without
consideration and was made with intent to hinder, delay, and
defraud plaintiff of its claim. Defendant's answer denied the
allegations charging intent to defraud and plead affirmatively
the defenses of the six year statute of limitations and laches.
In its reply filed pursuant to defendant's demand, plaintiff
denied the applicability of the statute of limitations and by
affidavit asserted that it had no knowledge of the transfer
and conveyance until June 1960, shortly before the commencement of the action. Defendant's motion for judgment on the
pleadings was overruled by the trial judge, who held that
the defense of the statute of limitations could only be determined by a trial on the merits of the factual issues presented.
The opinion of the Supreme Court reversing the trial
judge discusses fully the law applicable to the granting of
a motion for judgment on the pleadings as enunciated in the
recent case of Wooten v. Standard Life and Cas. Ins. Co.3
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature
of a general demurrer. It is appropriate, where the pleading is fatally deficient in substance, that is where the complaint fails to state a good cause of action in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant. Being in the nature
of a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings
raises an issue of law only. Where the plaintiff's pleadings are attacked, the motion should be sustained only
where they are so defective that the court is author*Attorney at Law, Columbia, S. C.
1. 239 S. C. 478, 123 S. E. 2d 870 (1962).

§ 57-801 (1952).
3. 239 S. C. 243, 122 S. E. 2d 637 (1961).

2. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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ized, taking all the facts to be admitted, in concluding
that no cause of action is stated entitling the plaintiff
to relief. However, if there is joined an issue of fact
upon which, if supported by the evidence, a valid judgment may be based, a judgment on the pleadings is improper; but it has been held that a judgment on the pleadings is allowable, not for lack of proof but for lack of
an issue; hence, it is proper where the pleadings entitle
the party to judgment without proof, as where they
disclose all of the facts, or where the pleadings present
no issue of fact or where the pleadings, under the circumstances, present an immaterial issue.
The Court concluded that there were no factual issues in
dispute respecting the accrual of the action so as to start
the running of the statute of limitations. The Court noted
that a nulla bona return was made by the sheriff, and this
fact, combined with plaintiff's knowledge that the defendant
previously owned real estate as asserted in its affidavit, was
sufficient as a matter of law to put plaintiff on notice that
that the real estate had been conveyed; the cause of action
having accrued at that time and being more than six years
prior to its commencement, it was hence barred by the statute.
In Wooten v. Standard Life and Cas. Life Ins. Co.,4 an
action was brought by the beneficiary of a life insurance
policy to recover the proceeds of the policy. The answer admitted the issuance of the policy and the company's refusal
to pay but denied that proof of death and other required documents had been furnished. The six year statute of limitations
was plead by way of affirmative defense, based upon defendant's contention that the action accrued upon death of the
insured on May 30, 1953; and the answer further alleged a
forfeiture under terms of the policy by reason of the failure to
file proof of death within 60 days. Defendant filed a motion
for judgment on the pleadings based upon its plea of the
statute of limitations, and in the alternative to require plaintiff to reply to the affirmative defense. The reply pursuant to
the order of the court asserted that plaintiff was under physical and mental disability and incapable of handling his affairs at the date of insured's death, which disability continued to the date of the reply. He alleged that notice of
death was given to the insurer in August 1953 and that the
4. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/14

2

Bernstein:
Pleading
SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW
REVIEW

[Vol. I6

claim was not rejected until June 1959. Upon the order of
the court directing Plaintiff to make his reply more definite
and certain by alleging the cause of his disability, he stated
that it was due to constant intoxication. Defendant then
moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that
voluntary intoxication would not be a sufficient disability to
toll the statute of limitations. The trial judge overruled the
motion and held that the cause of action did not accrue until
the rejection of plaintiff's claim in June 1959.
Upon appeal by defendant, the Supreme Court concluded
that there were material issues of fact raised by the pleadings
which justified denial of the motion. Since the record did
not contain the policy in question, the notice given by plaintiff, nor the defendant's letter rejecting the claim, the Court
held that the issues respecting the running of the statute of
limitations could only be determined upon trial of the action.
The order of the trial judge concluding that the status of
the parties became fixed upon rejection of the claim was
modified so that all of the issues raised by the pleadings
could be determined upon trial on the merits.
News and Courier Co. v. Delaney5 was an action to recover
the balance due on an advertising account. Defendant's answer admitted that the advertisements were published as
alleged and that statements were submitted, but denied that
anything was due to plaintiff "by reason of the matters hereinafter alleged." Defendant then interposed a counterclaim
in which he sought to recover damages resulting from the
alleged publication in plaintiff's newspaper of libelous matter
concerning him. Plaintiff's demurrer to the counterclaim
was sustained and the same was dismissed upon the ground
that the subject thereof was an alleged tort which did not
arise out of the contract or transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff's claim and was not
connected with the subject of the action. After failure of
the defendant to perfect his appeal from this order, plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. The final appeal
was from the order granting plaintiff's motion.
The Supreme Court noted that the only defenses alleged
were contained in the allegations of the counterclaim and
after these were stricken there was no issue left for the Court
to pass upon. The judgment of the lower court was sustained
5. 238 S. 0. 210, 119 S. E. 2d 742 (1961).
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upon the sustaining ground urged by plaintiff that the answer
was sham, irrelevant and frivolous under the applicable
statutes. 6 The Court acted in accordance with the rule permitting it to affirm on any grounds appearing in the record.7

Demurrer
In Skinner and Ruddock, ino. v. London Guar. and Ace. Co., s
suit was brought against both the insurer and its agent upon
a policy of insurance issued to indemnify plaintiff against
loss it might incur in the course of certain construction, and
upon a rider to said policy issued by the agent to include
loss resulting from certain demolition operations carried on
by the plaintiff. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff
had incurred losses arising from these demolition operations
and had adjusted the same upon the agent's authorization;
and that the insurer had denied liability on the ground that
the agent was not authorized to issue the endorsement covering the demolition work nor to adjust the loss. A demurrer
was interposed solely by the agent, a partnership, upon the
ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
against it.
In affirming the order of the lower court overruling the
demurrer, the Supreme Court followed the settled rule that
in consideration of a demurrer, the factual allegations are
to be considered as true and, together with relevant inferences
reasonably deducible therefrom, are to be liberally construed
in plaintiff's favor. The Court concluded that the complaint
properly stated a cause of action against the agent based
upon the factual allegations that it had acted without authority
in issuing the endorsement to the policy and adjusting the
loss, in application of the principle that where an agent makes
a contract in the name of his principal without authority and
does not bind the principal, he may be held personally liable
on the contract. The Court noted that the question as to
whether or not an action against the insurance company on
the contract could be properly joined with an action against
the agent based upon its alleged unauthorized acts was not
before it for decision; neither did the defendant's demurrer
6. CODS OF LAWS OP SOUT

CAROLINA § 10-654, § 10-1505 (1952).

7. Rule 4, Sem. 8, Supreme Court Rules.
8. 239 S. C. 614, 124 S. E. 2d 178 (1962).
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raise the question of the sufficiency of the allegations to,
9
state a cause of action against the co-defendant.
Hollifield v. Keller ' o involved two separate actions which
were heard together on appeal, one commenced in the circuit
court by the wife against the City of Columbia and certain
individual defendants as alleged joint tort feasors for injuries
resulting from an accident due to formation of ice on a city
street; and an action by the husband brought in the county
court based upon the same alleged delicts and seeking recovery
for loss of consortium by reason of the wife's injuries. The
City of Columbia made similar motions in both actions to
strike from the complaint the allegations characterizing the
acts of the defendants as "wilful and wanton;"-" and in the
wife's case, the word "painful" and to describe her injuries.
An additional motion in the husband's action was made to
strike the allegations relating to the wife's injuries and the
claim for loss of consortium. Identical demurrers were filed
in both actions on the grounds of improper joinder in that
the causes of action affected the various defendants differently, both of which were overruled by the respective courts.
The Supreme Court upheld the rulings of the lower courts
with respect to the demurrers. The complaint was analyzed as
stating only one cause of action against all of the defendants
as joint tort feasors, in that the individual defendants were
charged with negligently permitting water from their premises
to flow into the street and the city was charged with permitting it to remain and become frozen; all of the defendants
were thus held subject to suit in the same action.
With respect to the motions to strike the language "wilful
and wanton!', the Supreme Court held that these should have
been granted, reversing the county court in its ruling to the
contrary. The Court noted that the complaint sought the
recovery of actual damages only, and since punitive damages
are not recoverable in an action against a municipality, the
12
allegations stated should have been stricken as irrelevant.
9. It would seem to the writer that the defendant's position would have
been stronger had it demurred on the ground of misjoinder, since the two
causes of action appear to be mutually exclusive and do not affect "all the
parties" to the action, the latter being a pre-requisite for joinder under
CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-701 (1952).
10. 238 S. C. 584, 121 S. E. 2d 213 (1961).
11. The husband's action also included the word "reckless."
12. The Court seems to have departed from the rule that, the prayer for
relief is generally not considered as part of the complaint in determining
the nature of the action. Speizman v. Guill 202 S. C. 498, 25 S. E. 2d 731;
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The refusal of the circuit judge to strike the word "painful"
was affirmed, the decision being that pain and suffering
connected with a physical injury are proper elements of
damage in an action against a municipality under Code of
Laws of South Carolina § 47-70 (1952).
As to the motion to strike from the husband's complaint
the alegations respecting his claim for loss of services and
his right of consortium, the Court held that this should have
been granted. The statute was strictly construed as being in
derogation of the common law and was held not to embrace
within its terms by specific language an action against a
municipality for loss of consortium in favor of the husband.
The suficiency of the allegations of the complaint to state
.a cause of action was challenged by demurrer in Coletrain v.
Coletrain.13 Plaintiff sued her husband and the insurer of a
taxicab to recover for injuries she sustained while alighting
from the cab by reason of her husband's negligence in closing
the door on her hand. The question on appeal as stated in the
majority opinion was whether or not the husband became an
-additional insured under the omnibus clause of the liability
-policy so as to bind the insurer where he was using the taxicab with the admitted permission of the insured owner. The
,Court concluded that the demurrer was properly overruled,
:since the policy provisions did not confine the use of the
automobile to any part thereof or restrict its use to driving
-or operating the same; and the use to which it was being put
required the opening and closing of its doors. The Court
noted that the allegations of the complaint must be accepted
as true in consideration of the demurrer. The dissenting
,opinion, however, questioned whether or not permission to
open and close the doors of a public taxicab could, as a matter
of law and without being expressly alleged, be presumed to
have been given by the owner to a passenger.
The order overruling defendant's demurrer to the complaint
was affirmed on appeal in Lorick v. Davis Furn. Co. 14 The
State v. Broad River Power Co. 177 S. C. 240, 181 S. E. 41. Ordinarily, the

-allegations of "willfulness" characterizing the commission of a tort are
sufficient to give rise to a cause of action for punitive damages. Pickett
v. So. Ry. Co. 69 S. C. 445, 48 S. E. 466; Brasington v. So. Bound Ry. Co.

62 S. C. 325, 40 S. E. 665. In the view of the writer, the same result might
-have been reached by sustaining the demurrers for misjoinder upon the
authority of Clarke v. City of Greer 231 S. C. 327, 98 S. E. 2d 751 and
:Piper v. Am. Fid. & Cas. Co. 157 S. C. 106, 154 S. E. 106, however, perinitting plaintiff to remove the objectionable language by amendment.
13. 238 5. C. 555, 121 S, E. 2d89 (1961).

14. 238 S. C. 229, 119 S. E. 2d 732 (1961).
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complaint alleged that the plaintiff, a diamond merchant,
parted with possession of a diamond ring to defendant's wife
in expectation of sale, and that the return of the ring was
refused until' plaintiff should return certain articles of furniture purchased from defendant on which there was a balance
due, thereby forcing plaintiff to return the furniture in order
to recover possession of the ring. It was alleged that defendant's representations were false and were part of a
fraudulent scheme to repossess the furniture. The demurrer
questioned the sufficiency of the complaint to state a cause
of action on the grounds that it appeared upon the face thereof that (1) defendant was entitled to immediate possession of
the furniture by reason of default, (2) that plaintiff had no
right to possession of the ring but only an action on account
for the agreed price, and (3) that the parties had mutually
agreed for the return to each of the respective items. On
appeal defendant urged that the complaint was insufficient
to state a cause of action in fraud and deceit. The Supreme
Court held that this issue was not raised by the grounds
stated and that the demurrer as drawn was properly overruled by the trial judge.
Oxman v. Sherman'5 was an action to enforce by injunction
certain restrictive covenants contained in the agreement between the parties whereby the defendant was employed as
an agent to solicit insurance for the firm which plaintiff
represented as state manager. The complaint alleged a violation of three covenants, namely, (1) that defendant while
soliciting applications for the company, and for one year
thereafter, would not be connected in this state with any
other insurance company engaged in a similar business, (2)
that he would not induce any employees of the plaintiff to
terminate such employment, and (3) that he would not
induce any policy holder to terminate his insurance with
the company. The demurrer by which the defendant tested
the validity of the covenants was overruled by the trial judge.
On appeal the Supreme Court held that the first covenant
was unenforceable since the time limitation of one year after
defendant ceased soliciting applications had long since expired by reason of the promotion of defendant to unit manager. The Court noted further that defendant worked only in
two counties and the extension of the covenant to the entire
15. 239 S. C. 218, 122 S. E. 2d 559 (1961).
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state rendered it unenforceable. The allegations of the complaint, being accepted as true and liberally construed as is
the rule on demurrer, were held to state a proper cause of
action with respect to the other covenants challenged, which
were adjudged to be reasonable and enforceable. The order of
the trial judge overruling the demurrer was modified only
with respect to the ruling as to the first covenant.
Collins v. Collins'6 was an action for divorce by the wife
against her husband and for custody and support of their
minor child. The questions of pleading involved were raised
by two trustees of an irrevocable inter vivos trust in favor of
the husband, who were joined as defendants. One of the trustees, a non-resident, was served by mail out of the state. He
appeared specially and moved to quash the attempted service
upon him as ineffectual to confer jurisdiction upon the court.
The resident trustee demurred on the grounds that (1) the
provisions of the trust instrument set forth in the complaint
showed that the husband had no right to demand any part of
the principal or interest of the trust, the right to make payments being vested in the sole discretion of the trustee, (2)
the complaint failed to allege that the trust property was
within the courts jurisdiction, and (3) there was a defect of
parties in that the non-resident trustee was not subject to
the court's jurisdiction. The case proceeded to trial on the
merits with neither of the trustees participating. In the
final decree the trial judge overruled the demurrer and
ordered that, in default by the husband in making any of
the payments directed to be made by him, the trustees should
make the same out of the trust estate. The motion to quash
was not expressly passed upon.
The Supreme Court held that it was error not to allow the
resident trustee to answer the complaint after his demurrer

was overruled since there was no suggestion that it was interposed in bad faith. It was also held to be error not to
permit the non-resident defendant to appear generally or to
answer to the merits after the jurisdictional objections were
overruled. 17 The Court further held that the motion to quash
should have been granted since the action was in personam
and the non-resident trustee was not served within the jurisdiction; it was not an in rem action against the trust assets
nor were they within the courts jurisdiction.
16. 239 S. C. 170, 122 S. E. 2d 1 (1961).

17. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 10-644, § 10-648 (1952).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol15/iss1/14

8

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

Bernstein: Pleading

[Vol. 15

As to the demurrer, the Court held that it should have
been sustained on the first ground, since the complaint showed
on its face that by the express provisions of the trust instrument the husband would have no right to compel payment
of any part of the fund until he reached 28 years and there
was no allegation that he had reached the required age.
Gordon v. Fid. and Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y.-1 was an action
in fraud and deceit based upon the medical coverage provisions
of a liability policy issued by the defendant. The complaint
alleged that plaintiff, a soldier, sustained an injury which
required his hospitalization and treatment in the government
hospital at Fort Jackson, and sought to recover the reasonable value thereof, although it was agreed that plaintiff incurred no expense for such hospitalization. The alleged fraud
was that the company's agent had represented to him that the
medical coverage clause would be effective if he were confin-d to an army hospital, even though no expense would be
incurred by him as required by the terms of the policy. Fraud
was further alleged in that the agent failed to disclose to him
that the policy would not cover medical and hospital treatment
at a government hospital, which he was under a duty to disclose. The defendant demurred on the ground that it affirmatively appeared from the complaint (1) that plaintiff
had not incurred any medical expense and there was hence
no liability under the terms of the policy and (2) that plaintiff had ample opportunity prior to his hospitalization to discover the coverage of the policy. The trial judge overruled
the demurrer.
In reversing, the Supreme Court reiterated the rule that
in passing upon a demurrer the court is limited to a consideration of the pleadings under attack, all of the factual allegations thereof properly pleaded being deemed admitted; the
allegation of fraud and deceit, being merely a conclusion of
the pleader, is not admitted by demurrer. The medical coverage provision of the policy was held to be free from ambiguity
and to cover only medical expense actually incurred. There
was no actionable fraud for the reason that plaintiff had
failed to take advantage of the opportunity given him to
learn the contents of the policy as to medical coverage.
Furthermore, there was no allegation of a relationship of
18. 238 S. C. 438, 120 S. E. 2d 509 (1961).
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trust and confidence which would have placed the duty of
disclosure upon defendant's agent.
Counterclaim - PartnershipAccounting
The order of the trial judge sustaining demurrers to several
defenses and counterclaims interposed by the plaintiff and
striking certain allegations from the answer was reversed
on appeal in Few v. Few,19 an action for an accounting between partners. The complaint, seeking actual and punitive
damages, alleged that defendant had breached a contract
-with plaintiff, under the terms of which they were to engage
in raising and selling cattle as partners, and had failed to
account to the plaintiff for his share of the profits and for
other sums due. The answer contained several defenses and
counterclaims, the first of which alleged that defendant had
spent thousands of dollars for improvements, fertilizer, ect.,
for which he was entitled to reimbursement; by his second
defense, defendant counterclaimed for his share of the money
spent for improvements on a farm which both parties owned
as tenants in common; by the third defense and counterclaim,
defendant sought an accounting for items of farm equipment
in plaintiff's possession; the fourth defense and counterclaim
sought an accounting for sales of cattle by the plaintiff; and
the fifth counterclaim sought an accounting for crops planted
upon jointly owned lands and for horses and cows furnished
by defendant. The plaintiff demurred to the second defense
and counterclaim on the ground that an action to recover for
improvements could only be had in a partition action, and to
the third and fifth counterclaims on the ground that there was
no allegation of a demand for an accounting and a refusal,
and that defendant's remedy was by claim and delivery.
Plaintiff also moved to strike from the first defense the
allegation as to the expenditures for improvements and
fertilizers on the ground that the cost thereof could only
be recovered in a suit for partition.
The Supreme Court characterized the action as one for
breach of contract rather than in tort and held that the
use of the words "fraudulent", "flagrant" and "wilful"
would not change the essence of the action. Since the counterclaim for improvements arose out of the contract or transaction set forth as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim,
19. 239 S. C. 321, 122 S. E. 2d 829 (1961).
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it was held to be properly interposed and defendant would
not be limited to an action in partition. As to the third and
fifth counterclaims, it was held that no demand for an accounting would be required since a fiduciary relationship
existed between the partners; the defendant could not be restricted to an action in claim and delivery, such action not
being available to partners where neither party owns the
property separately; and the defendant could properly seek
an accounting for the crops grown upon the lands jointly
owned. The order striking from the first defense the allegations as to improvements made by the defendant was likewise
reversed.
Counterclaim - Wrongful Death Action
No question of pleading was involved directly in Ellison
v. Simmons. 20 The Supreme Court, however, had occasion to
comment upon the rule respecting the right of a defendant
to file a counterclaim for personal injuries against the executors, in an action for wrongful death brought on behalf of
the statutory beneficiaries of the deceased. The defendant
in the action did not file a counterclaim but attempted to
offer evidence that he had entered a separate suit against
the estate for personal injuries and for property damages,
which upon objection was excluded. The trial judge refused
to charge defendant's request that in a wrongful death action,
he was not permitted by law to interpose a counterclaim
but was required to bring a separate action for damages
claimed. The Supreme Court reiterated the rule that defendant had no cause of action for damages to his person or property against the executors as representatives of the benficiaries in an action for wrongful death, and could not assert
such action by way of counterclaim so as to diminish plaintiff's recovery; hence, evidence of the pendency of defendant's independent action was not admissible. It was likewise
held proper for the trial judge to refuse to charge the jury
that defendant could not interpose a counterclaim in the action
but must proceed by a separate action, since such charge was
not responsive to any issue raised by the pleadings.
Amendment to Answer
The question presented on appeal in Alamance Industries v.
Chesterfield Hosiery Mills 21 was whether the trial judge erred
20. 238 S. C. 364, 120 S. E. 2d 209 (1961).
21. 239 S. C. 287, 122 S. E. 2d 648 (1961).
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in refusing to allow defendant to amend its answer by pleading a separate defense and counterclaim for fraud and deceit.
The action was commenced in November 1959, in which the
plaintiff sought to recover the amount allegedly due under
the terms of a written patent license agreement, and the
-original answer, filed February 1960, denied the indebtedness
-due. Approximately eight months later, and within 5 days
-of the commencement of the term of court at which the
-case was to be tried, defendant served notice that it would
move to amend its answer. Defendant simultaneously served
the proposed amendment, which added a counterclaim for
,damages based upon alleged fraudulent representations made
to a former president of the defendant corporation, who had
.sold his stock to defendant's president prior to the commencement of the action. The Supreme Court found no abuse of
discretion in the refusal of the trial judge to permit the
-amendment since it appeared that the defendant could have
discovered the facts long before the amendment was proposed.
'The Court noted that the power to permit an amendment
under Code of Laws of South Carolina § 10-692 (1952),
-although not unlimited, is nevertheless broad and its exercise
by the lower court will rarely be disturbed; it does not follow,
however, that every proposed amendment before trial must
,be allowed.
Making More Definite ancd Certain
In Johnston v. Williams2 2 an action for damages and for a
-mandatory injunction was brought against defendant for
-obstructing the flow of water across his lands, causing plain-tiff's lands to be flooded. The question of pleading raised on
-appeal was defendant's contention that the issue as to whether
or not the drainway was a natural water course was im:properly considered, since the complaint did not so allege,
and only the obstruction of surface waters was involved. The
'Court overruled this contention, since defendant had made no
-motion or objection to the lack of such allegations in the
-complaint and testimony was introduced without objection,
-to sustain plaintiff's position. The Court noted that if the
-defendant desired to have the complaint state the character
of the waterway which was obstructed, he should have moved
to make the complaint more definite and certain in this par22. 238 S. C. 623, 121 S. E. 2d 223 (1961).
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ticular. Since he had failed to do so and the testimony
was introduced without objection, this became an issue in the
case.
Motion to Strike
The question of pleading raised in Margolis v. Telech2 was.
the propriety of the ruling of the trial judge in strikingcertain allegations from the defendant's answer. The complaint stated an action for malicious prosecution resultingfrom the prosecution of the plaintiff by the defendant on a.
charge of grand larcency by reason of the removal of a certain
ring from defendant's home. Upon call of the case for trial,
the trial judge, upon plaintiff's motion, ordered stricken from
defendant's answer as irrelevant and immaterial allegations.
relative to the proceedings before the grand jury in its deliberations on the indictment against the plaintiff. The defendant sought to show that he had charged the plaintiff in
the warrant sworn out before the magistrate with the offense of grand larcency only, and that the indictment as,
presented to the grand jury also charged her with the more
serious crime of house breaking. He alleged that he consented to the return of the indictment, which included both
offenses, as a "no bill" at the suggestion of members of thegrand jury, and he did not wish to prosecute the plaintiff,
his wife's sister, for house breaking out of respect to his,
wife's memory.
The Supreme Court noted that an inquiry as to deliberations
of the grand jury to determine why a "no bill" was returned'
is prohibited by the rule of secrey respecting the deliberations of that body. Since the testimony to support the foregoing allegations as to what took place in the grand jury room
would be inadmissible, the allegations were held to be properlystricken from the answer.
Lancaster v. Sweat 24 points up the distinction between a
motion to strike a defense as irrelevant and redundant, and
a motion to strike a defense as sham. The action was brought
to recover for damages to plaintiff's dwelling caused by thenegligence of defendant in the operation of an automobile.
Defendant's second defense alleged that plaintiff was not the
real party in interest for the reason that he had been fullypaid for the loss by an insurance company. Plaintiff's motioir
23. 239 S. C.232, 122 S. E. 2d 417 (1961).
24. 239 S. C. 120, 121 S. E. 2d 444 (1961).
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to strike this defense was treated as one for irrelevancy and
redundancy, his principal ground being that the damages
alleged were not the same as those covered in the loan receipt
from the insurance company. At the hearing of the motion
the loan receipt was exhibited and considered by the court
without objection and the language was ordered stricken.
On appeal this procedure was regarded as erroneous. The
Court held that the motion, being one for irrelevancy, is in
the nature of a demurrer, the question being whether or
not the matter sought to be stricken constitutes a defense to
the cause of action alleged; in the determination of such
motion, only the pleadings are considered. By way of distinction, the Court noted that a sham answer is good in form
but false in fact and not pleaded in good faith; a motion to
strike as sham presents a question of fact to be determined
by the court upon affidavits or in such manner as the court
may direct. Considered in light of the pleadings only, the
allegations sought to be stricken were held to be neither irrelevant nor redundant.
Reply to New Matter
The appeal in Plummer v. Ind. Life and Ace. Ins. Co. 25 was

from an order refusing defendant's motion pursuant to Code
of Laws of South Carolina § 10-661 (1952) to require plaintiff to reply to a plea of accord and satisfaction set up in
the answer. Suit was brought by the widow as the beneficiary
of an insurance policy on the life of her husband for an alleged fraudulent breach thereof. The pertinent allegations
of the complaint were that the insured died as the result of
an accident, that the company paid the natural death benefit
but refused to pay the additional accidental death benefit,
and that the company's agent fraudulently induced her to sign
an instrument purporting to be a general release of liability
under all policies issued by the company, including the policy
in question. It was alleged that the company's agent, knowing that the plaintiff was an illiterate Negro with no knowledge of insurance, failed to read or explain the contents of
the release to her and suppressed its nature and effect.
Defendant by answer denied that insured died as a result
of an accident and alleged that the company paid to plaintiff
the natural death benefits under five different policies, and
25. 238 S. C. 313, 120 S. E. 2d 108 (1961).
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that the release executed by plaintiff included the five specific
policies as well as all others issued by defendant on the life
of the insured. The defendant further alleged that the settlement was fair and reasonable, and was explained to the
beneficiary; and pleaded the release as a bar unless plaintiff
proved fraud in its execution and returned the consideration.
The Supreme Court noted that the statute under which defendant's motion was filed leaves the granting of the same
to the discretion of the court. Ordinarily the plaintiff is required to reply to an answer where the defendant sets up a
release so that the defendant can determine the nature of
the attack plaintiff will make upon the release. Since the
plaintiff had referred to the release in her complaint and
alleged that it was fraudulently procured, the court held
that the defendant had notice of plaintiff's attack thereupon
and there was no abuse of discretion in the refusal to require
plaintiff to reply.
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